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WASHINGTON
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME I JUNE, 1925 NUMBER 1
DUAL SOVEREIGNTY AND THE SUPREME COURT.
THE Articles of Confederation were little else than a treaty of
alliance between thirteen wholly sovereign states. The National
Government operated solely upon the States. It had no power over
the citizen. His contracts and his allegiance were solely with and
to his State. An Act of Congress was a law without a sanction,
since the National Government had no judiciary to construe it, no
executive to enforce it. Congress had none of the powers of a
sovereign government. It could only recommend. Disorder was
rife. A total separation of the States seemed imminent, yet union
there must be if the hopes of the Revolution were to be realized.
The grave situation of the States and of the people presented a
problem almost unique; the solution of that problem by the Con-
stitutional Convention was wholly so. It was without precedent in
the annals of mankind. Leagues of independent sovereign entities
bound together by treaty compact for the common weal, there had
been; completely unified nations having central governments vested
with the full sovereignty there were; but "an indissoluble Union
composed of indestructible States" based on the concept of a dual
sovereignty, there was not, nor ever had been. This is not intended
as an assertion that the Constitution was an original production. Its
framers gleaned much from history, much from the two centuries
of institutional growth of England and took many provisions from
various state constitutions. But the basic principle of dual sover-
eignty, a dual citizenship carrying a two-fold allegiance, combining
national strength and individual liberty, the citizen amenable to
both state and national laws, was an original concept.
In the National Government were vested those powers of which
the exercise pertains to the whole people; such as dealing with
foreign nations, establishing a uniform currency, waging war, laying
tariffs and regulating affairs between the States, thus creating a gov-
ernment strong enough to meet external aggression and to preserve
internal order.
To the States severally were reserved all those powers the exer-
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cise of which is essential to the control of their domestic affairs,
thus leaving with the people of each state the regulation of all mat-
ters of local concern, preserving a close contact of the citizen with
the more intimate processes of government and insuring that dif-
fused political life without which despotism in some form is certain
to develop.
The historian, Elson, speaking of our Constitution, says:
"It created, without historic precedent, a federal-na-
tional government. It combined national strength with
individual liberty in a degree so remarkable as to attract
the world's admiration. Never before in the history of
man has a government struck so fine a balance between
liberty and union, between state rights and national sover-
eignty. The world had labored for ages to solve this
greatest of all governmental problems, but it had labored
in vain."
The governmental machinery devised to maintain this nice
balance between the two sovereignties was not original. In its
general design it followed the division of powers advocated by
Montesquieu in his Spirit of Laws.
The powers of the National Government were distributed among
three great equal and coordinate departments, Legislative, Executive
and Judicial, each to operate within the limits prescribed for it by
the Constitution. Manifestly so long as each of these departments
shall function only 'within those circumscribed limits there can be
no usurpation of despotic powers and no invasion of the rights
reserved to the States and to the people. Manifestly, also, in order
to confine each of these departments to the exercise of only such
powers as are assigned to it, and to restrain the Federal Government
on the one hand from any invasion of the reserved rights of the
States, and the State Governments on the other hand from any in-
vasion of the powers granted to the National Government, the power
to construe the Constitution and measure all laws, both State and
Federal, by the standard of the Constitution had to be reposed in
some person or tribunal. That power is essentially judicial and
was, by a necessary implication of the "supreme law" clause of the
Constitution, reposed in the Judiciary. It is by virtue of this clause
that the Supreme Court exercises the power to pronounce upon the
constitutionality of laws and to declare void any legislative act re-
pugnant to the Constitution, a power never exercised by any other
judicial body in the world. That is not because of any new power
invented and reposed in that court. It arises ex necessitate from our
unique system of dual government, from the distribution of the
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powers of the National Government among coordinate departments,
from the fact that the Constitution is the supreme law of the land,
and from the ordinary power and correlative duty of every court to
construe and apply the law. There is nothing new or strange in
the relation of the Supreme Court to the Constitution. It is the
universal relation of courts to law.
Just so long as the Constitution shall be "the supreme law of
the land" will the Supreme Court possess this power. The two
things are correlative and inseparable, for it is of the very essence
of a court to construe and apply the law. When, if ever, this power
shall be taken from the Supreme Court, either the Constitution
will have ceased to be the supreme law of the land, or the Supreme
Court will have ceased to be a court. The defense of this power
by Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison is unanswerable.
He said:
"It is a proposition too plain to be contested, that the
Constitution controls any legislative act repugnant to it;
or that the legislature may alter the Constitution by an
ordinary act.
"Between these alternatives there is no middle ground.
The Constitution is either a superior paramount law, un-
changeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level with
ordinary legislative acts, and like other acts, is alterable
when the legislature shall please to alter it.
"If the former part of the alternative be true, then a
legislative act contrary to the Constitution is not law; if
the latter part be true, then written constitutions are absurd
attempts, on the part of the people, to limit a power in its
own nature illimitable. * ** *
"It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is. Those who apply the
rule to particular cases must of necessity expound and inter-
pret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the
courts must decide on the operation of each."
These things are simple and elementary but the many latter day
proposals to so amend the Constitution as to curtail o abrogate this
essential power of the Supreme Court seem to call for a continual
emphasis of fundamental things if the Federal Republic inaugurated
and sustained by the Constitution is to stand.
Until recent times there has been shown little disposition on the
part of the people frequently to amend the Constitution, and but
slight tendency so to amend it as to disturb the equipoise of the
three great coordinate branches of the Federal Government, or to
transfer to that government so large a part of the reserved powers
of the States and of the people as to endanger the dual sovereignty
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on which our institutions rest. But there has been a persistent
recurrence of proposals during the last fifteen years to do both of
these things.
The first eight amendments comprise the Bill of Rights. The
ninth and tenth emphasize the reserved sovereignty of the States.
These ten were adopted in 1791, almost contemporaneously with the
original Constitution. The Eleventh Amendment withdrew from
the Federal Courts jurisdiction of any suit against a State by a
citizen of another State or of a foreign nation. The Twelfth,
changing the manner of electing the president and vice-president,
was adopted in 1804. The next three amendments were the product
of the Civil War. No others were adopted till 1913. Since then
four amendments have been made. As indicated by Judge Saner in
his address as last retiring President of the American Bar Associa-
tion, during the period from 1804 to 1913, three amendments were
made, an average of one to every 36 years. Since 1913 four have
been adopted, an average of one in less than three years. There
have recently been pending before Congress nearly 100 proposals to
amend the Constitution. Many of these seek to transfer to the
National Government the control of affairs originally reserved to
the States. It has become the fashion for protagonists of Federal
legislation found to be invasive of State sovereignty, immediately
to wage an intensive campaign so to amend the Constitution as to
transfer the obstructing segment of the rights of the States to the
National Government. This evidences a most dangerous tendency
which if long enough and successfully indulged will eventually wear
away all of the reserved powers of the States, transfer the control of
all local affairs to Federal bureaus operated from Washington, and
ultimately make the States mere administrative subdivisions of a
completely centralized nation. Our government will then no longer
be a Federal Republic but a centralized bureaucracy.
As said by John Fiske in his Beginnings of New England:
"If the time should ever arise (which God forbid) when
the people of the different parts of our country should
allow their local affairs to be administered by the prefects
sent from Washington, and when the self-government of
the states shall have been so far lost as one of the Depart-
ments of France, or even so far as that of the Counties
of England; on that day the progressive, political career
of the American people will have to come to an end, and
the hopes that have been built up for the future happiness
and prosperity of mankind will be wrecked forever."
This process of revolution by constitutional amendment in detail,
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though ultimately destructive of all state sovereignty, would still
leave whatever of guaranty against despotism is furnished by the
division of the Federal powers among the three coordinate depart-
ments. The Legislative department would still be a check upon the
Executive; the Executive would still exercise some restraint upon the
Legislative; the Judiciary would still serve to confine both the
Legislative and the Executive within their respective spheres of con-
stitutional action. The proposals so to amend the Constitution as to
take away from the Supreme Court the power to declare an act of
Congress unconstitutional, or to curtail that power, would, if suc-
cessful, destroy or greatly impair the last remnant of our constitu-
tional system.
The proposal to require the concurrence of all, or of more than
a majority of the Supreme Court to declare a law unconstitutional
carries its own condemnation. It concedes that the question of the
constitutionality of a law is a judicial question. It concedes the
principle 'that the Constitution is the supreme law of the land and
that legislation in conflict therewith is not the law but void. Yet
it would vest the power to determine what is the law, not in the
Supreme Court, or in a majority of its members, but in a minority.
It would be absurd to assume that a minority, the number and per-
sonnel of which would inevitably vary in different cases, would be
more able, learned, patriotic or honest, than the majority, or even
an equal number of the majority; but it is only on that assumption
that even a specious argument can be made in favor of such an
amendment. It is no answer to say that it should be made more
difficult for the court to hold that a law is unconstitutional than that
it is not. Such is already the case. It is and has been the law,
as declared by the court from the beginning, that every legislative
act is presumed to be constitutional and that this presumption must
be overcome before the court will hold to the contrary. This pre-
sumption is as binding upon the majority of the Supreme Court as
it is upon the minority. We are thus driven back to the absurd
assumption that dissent connotes superior learning, patriotism and
integrity.
Let it be remembered, moreover, that the Supreme Court has not,
nor has it ever assumed to have any general veto power over the
legislation of Congress. It does not pass upon the constitutionality
of legislation in the abstract, but only when that question is in-
volved in bona fide litigation between competent parties, much more
often than otherwise in cases touching the life, liberty or property of
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the citizen. The proposed amendment would make the rights of one
citizen dependent upon the judgment of a minority of the Court
and of another citizen dependent upon the judgment of the majority
of that body, merely because the one claimed a right guaranteed
by the Constitution while the other claimed a right under common or
statutory law. Such a discrimination is shocking to the moral sense.
The most recent proposal is so to amend the Constitution as to
permit Congress to pass upon the constitutionality of its own acts.
This would, at one stroke, destroy our system of constitutional
government, substituting therefor a purely parliamentary system
like that of England. In The American Commonwealth, James
Bryce, perhaps the most profound student of political history since
Madison, says:
"If such a body as Congress were permitted to decide
whether the acts it had passed were constitutional, it would
of course decide in its own favor, and to allow it to decide
would be to put the Constitution at its mercy."
Contrasting our government with that of England he points out
that the whole sovereignty of the English people is vested in the
British Parliament and that Parliament is a sovereign constituent
assembly, irresponsible and omnipotent.
"It can make and unmake any and every law, change the
form of government or the succession to the crown, inter-
fere with the course of justice, extinguish the most sacred
rights of the citizen."
All executive functions, though exercised in the name of the
crown, are actually exercised by the ministers who sit with and are
in fact a committee of parliament chosen by the majority for the
time being.
To give to Congress the power to pass upon the constitutionality
of its own acts would at once eliminate the Judiciary as one of the
three coordinate departments of our Federal Government. Of the
two then remaining, the Executive would ave no protection against
the encroachments of the Legislative. Remembering the many bitter
contests between these two departments which our history presents,
can anyone believe that, possessing the unlimited power which such
an amendment would give, Congress would long leave with the
Executive a vestige of the power reposed in that department by the
Constitution? All the executive powers would soon be exercised by
Congress through one or more of its committees. The President of
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the United States would inevitably become as completely a mere fig-
urehead as is the King of England or the President of France. Now
and again a strong and popular President, backed by an overwhelm-
ing public approval, might for the time being successfully assert some
measure of his constitutional authority, but since every Act of
Congress, when declared constitutional by a majority vote of that
body would in itself operate as an amendment to the Constitution,
it is obvious that in the long run there would be left no constitu-
tional authority for any president, however able or popular, to
assert.
More slowly but as surely would disappear the dual sovereignty
upon which our Federal Republic rests. The growing tendency to
cut into the reserved powers of the States and of the people by con-
stitutional amendment in detail, which is hardly restrained by the
present deliberative method of amendment, could be so easily in-
dulged that the progress of centralization would be greatly acceler-
ated. The States would eventually become mere administrative
entities; a State Governor would have less actual power than the
mayor of a city; a State Legislature fewer subjects of legislation
than a town council. Fiske's prophecy would become reality.
It is no answer to say that the members of Congress are elected
for given terms and are presumably patriotic men. This may be
granted, but if there is any one thing that history teaches it is the
fact that unlimited power will, sooner or later, be exercised to the
full. As said by Bryce:
"Men come and go, but an assembly goes on forever;
it is immortal, because while the members change, the
policy, the passion for extending its authority, the tenacity
in clinging to what it has once gained, remain persistent."
In this connection let us recall Judge Saner's remark that an Eng-
lish Parliament, contrary to a long established custom, once extended
its own life from three to seven years. It may be added that it was
only dissolved by a military dictator.
Such an amendment would not be evolution but revolution. It
would not be progress but a reversion to an earlier type of govern-
ment. There are many who earnestly believe that a pure parliamen-
tary government is the best government, because it is the most
quickly responsive to the popular will. But again history shows that
a quick response usually registers the emotions as Eontrasted with
the mature judgments of a people. The fact that parliamentary
8 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
government has worked well in England, "a tight little island" with
a homogeneous population having a close unity of interests and
traditions, is no earnest that it would even be tolerable for a people
so widespread, so diverse in character and interests as our own. Ours
is a country almost as large as the continent of Europe, with economic
and social characteristics almost as varied as its climate and its soil.
The parliamentary system has never been tested under such con-
ditions. Our Federal system has been so tested. Under its shelter-
ing egis our people have reduced a vast wilderness to a noble collec-
tion of separate, self-governing States, united in all things that per-
tain to the people as a whole. If we abandon that system we shall
lose measurably in the beginning, but immeasurably in the end.
TAQOMA Overton G. Ellis.
